possibility and history of Christian philosophy took place between
major authors in French-speaking philosophical and theological
circles. These authors include Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain,
Maurice Blondel, Gabriel Marcel, Fernand Van Steenberghen and Antonin
Sertillanges. The debates provided occasion for participants to
clarify their positions on the relationships between philosophy,
Christianity, theology and history, and they involved issues such as
the relationship between faith and reason, the nature of reason,
reason's grounding in the concrete human subject, the problem of the
supernatural, and the nature and ends of philosophy itself. The
debates led participants to self-consciously re-evaluate their own
philosophical commitments and address the problem of philosophy's
nature in a novel and rigorous manner.
Although these debates originally took place between Roman Catholics
and secular Rationalists, fundamental differences between different
Roman Catholic positions rapidly became apparent and assumed central
importance. The debates also drew attention from Reformed Protestant
thinkers. Eventually the debates sparked smaller discussions among
scholars in English, German, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian-speaking
circles, and these continue to the present day. This article provides
a brief overview of the most important contributors, the central
issues and the main positions of these debates.
1. Introduction
The use of the term "Christian philosophy" and other similar
expressions dates back to the early Christian era. However,
considerable ambiguity surrounding the term pervades philosophical
reflection regarding Christian philosophy's possibility, historical
reality and nature, and therefore affects efforts to generate and
evaluate particular Christian philosophies. The 1930s French Debates
represent a period of the most sustained and systematic examination of
the problems concerning Christian philosophy, and are thus of
philosophical significance for various reasons.
First, they involve perennial issues raised in philosophy, including
the relationships between faith and reason, philosophy and theology,
the nature of human reason and its limits in the face of religion, the
nature of religion, historical relationships between Christian
thought, practice and the development of particular philosophical
systems and the nature of philosophy itself. The debates led
participants to self-consciously re-evaluate their own philosophical
commitments and address the problem of philosophy's nature in a novel
and rigorous manner.
Second, the debates are momentous due to the renown of their
participants, most of whom had earned significant places in
Francophone philosophical establishments, both secular or Christian.
Practically all of the major interlocutors approached the issues armed
with years of previous study, reflection and in some cases polemical
engagements. Each of them was thus able to develop further insights
and to more systematically elaborate their positions during the
ensuing debates on the basis of their previous philosophical work.
Third, the debates and their participants' personal positions on
Christian philosophy have generated an ever-growing philosophical
literature. Given that issues germane to Christian philosophy had
never before nor since been examined so thoroughly, contemporary
discussions regarding Christian philosophy greatly benefit from the
1930s Debates.
2. The Historical Background and Development of the Debates
Without providing a comprehensive historic overview for the 1930s
Debates, several historical developments allowing context are to be
considered at this juncture.
The onset of modernity produced radically new schools of philosophical
thought, increasingly secularized culture, institutions, disciplines
and discourses, and in some cases suspicion or outright repudiation of
previous philosophical and theological traditions, religious authority
and of Christianity itself. While issues raised by the contact between
Christianity and philosophy were addressed in late antiquity, the
"problem of Christian philosophy" was not explicitly framed until
these developments came about. Thus Christian philosophy became a
central problem for 17th and 18th century thinkers such as Pascal,
Malebranche, Descartes, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Catholic Traditionalists
(such as de Maistre and Lammenais), neo-Scholastics and other
Thomists, and Maurice Blondel.
Another major development stemmed from the impetus given to Catholic
philosophical work by several papal encyclicals. Leo XIII's Aeterni
Patris dealt explicitly with the relationship between philosophy and
Christianity, and exhorted the return to study of Thomas Aquinas.
While it never made Thomism the official philosophy of the Roman
Catholic Church, it gave pride of place to Aquinas' work, and within a
generation Thomist philosophy became established as the dominant and
representative form of Catholic philosophical thought. Aeterni Patris
also had the side-effect of encouraging renewed attention to other
mediaeval Christian thinkers, including Augustine, Anselm,
Bonaventure, Scotus and Ockham. During the Modernism crisis, Pius X's
Pascendi exerted a different effect. The document diagnosed
philosophical bases of the heresy of "modernism" and reinforced the
centrality to be accorded to Thomism. With respect to Christian
philosophy, the two documents might be summarized thus: the first
suggested where Christian philosophy should be found and further
developed; the second indicated where Christian philosophy could not
be found and further developed.
Furthermore, in France a revitalization had taken place in
metaphysics, moral philosophy and philosophical anthropology (all
areas, as Etienne Gilson pointed out, central to Christian
philosophy), due in part to renewed interest in Thomist and
Augustinian studies and also to the influence of Henri Bergson and
Maurice Blondel. In addition, the term "Christian philosophy" began to
enjoy greater currency in the early part of the 20th century,
particularly by the 1920s. This engendered two main lines of thought.
First, the Debates provoked counter-responses by both secular,
rationalist philosophers and by Catholic, neo-Scholastic philosophers
who agreed for different reasons that the notion of Christian
philosophy was a false one. Second, they produced reflection and
dialogue on the part of Catholic and Reformed Protestant philosophers
who considered the term to designate a distinctively Christian manner
of philosophizing. By the time the debates officially began at the
March 1931 meeting of the Société Française de Philosophie, the issue
was primed for sustained discussion by the Francophone philosophical
and theological communities.
Several participants had articulated their views on Christian
philosophy prior to the debates. Emile Bréher dismissed the idea of
Christian philosophy in relevant portions of his History of
Philosophy, and in 1928 presented his argument at a set of conferences
in Belgium. Etienne Gilson published books on Augustine, Bonaventure
and Aquinas, making use of the term "Christian philosophy". Along with
Blondel and Jacques Maritain, she contributed discussions of Christian
philosophy to various works commemorating the 1,500 year anniversary
of the death of Augustine.
The specific catalyst for the debates was Xavier Leon's proposal to
Gilson that he and Léon Brunscvicg should debate the status of Thomist
philosophy as a philosophy. Gilson in return proposed the broader
topic "Christian philosophy", asking that Brehier be included.
Maritain also participated, taking Gilson's side. Blondel contributed
a letter highly critical of Gilson's position at the meeting, and
published a response to Bréhier's criticisms.
The Debates expanded in numerous forums over the next four years.
Articles and conference contributions by around fifty different
authors appeared in journals, at first mainly in French, then later in
German, Italian, Spanish, English and even Latin. Gilson, Maritain,
Blondel and Regis Jolivet each published books focused on Christian
philosophy in 1931-33. The Société Thomiste devoted their 1933
conference to the topic of Christian philosophy, and the Société
d'Etudes Philosophiques devoted theirs that same year to discussion of
Blondel's Le problème de la philosophie chrétienne. By around 1936,
the Debates came to a close. Although they did not end in conclusive
or universally acknowledged success for any of the participants, the
positions of dominant schools of thought regarding Christian
philosophy had been firmly established.
The issue of Christian philosophy has continued to spur philosophical
reflection, taking literary form in conference presentations,
articles, books and papal documents (e.g. John Paul II's Fides et
Ratio and Benedict XVI's recent Regensburg address on Faith, Reason
and the University) and motivating a number of conferences and special
journal volumes devoted to the topic. One smaller and later set of
debates worth noting took place in the late 1940s and early 50s among
Francophone Reformed Protestant philosophers and theologians, inspired
by Roger Mehl's The Condition of the Christian Philosopher, and
included several Reformed thinkers who had played minor roles in the
1930s debates – Jacques Bois, Pierre Guérin and Arnold Reymond.
3. Positions Against Christian Philosophy
a. Gilson's Overview
Etienne Gilson provides a useful overview and typology of the
positions opposed to the possibility of Christian philosophy,
distinguishing three main stances: "theologism" (now more generally
called "fideism"), "rationalism" and certain types of
Neo-Scholasticism.
Gilson had originally singled out "certain doctors of the Middle Ages"
as representatives of theologism, for whom
the Christian religion excludes philosophy, because Christianity
is a doctrine of salvation, because one can be saved without
philosophy, and even because it is more difficult to be saved with
philosophy than without it. . . . Medieval philosophy was the negation
of this obscurantism, but still it did exist. For men of that type,
the very notion of Christian philosophy could only rest on an
equivocation. It signifies that where Christianity is, it is useless
or dangerous that philosophy be. (Bulletin de la Société française de
Philosophie, p. 41)
Gilson's later works (The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy and
Christianity and Philosophy ) expand this position, engaging the
thought of Luther, Calvin and their later interpreters.
Gilson also criticizes another position regarding "theologism" (The
Unity of Philosophical Experience, p.31-60): this is one where the
term "Christian philosophy" signifies Christian revelation or
Christian theology, disregarding the distinct role, discipline and
methods of philosophy. In certain respects the rationalist position
mirrors the theologist one:
[W]here philosophy is, it is dangerous that Christianity should
be. This is the position of pure rationalism, i.e., of those who do
not accept a limited role for rationalism. Whatever the content may be
of the diverse philosophies reason elaborates, it is insofar as
rational that they are philosophies. To want to subordinate them to a
dogma or to a faith is to destroy philosophy's essence….[T]heology
bases itself on faith, which is something irrational. To make
philosophy the servant of theology is therefore to make the rational
depend on the irrational, i.e, to suppress its very rationality. (Bul.
Soc fr. Phil., p. 41)
At their root, rationalist positions on Christian philosophy, on one
ground or another, eliminate or exclude from the field of philosophy
any philosophical system, doctrine or author who brings reason, the
instrument of philosophy, into contaminating contact with religious
faith, practice, or thought, which would vitiate the philosophy's
rational and autonomous development. Numerous philosophical positions,
schools, or even environments of basic cultural and philosophical
presuppositions developed during or in the wake of the European
Enlightenment fit rationalism's profile. Arguably, even philosophies
critical of the Enlightenment but devotedly committed to a necessarily
secularist view of philosophy can, on the issue of Christian
philosophy, be regarded as analogues of rationalism.
From rationalist perspectives, Patristic and Medieval thought, as well
as those of their modern interpreters, would not legitimately deserve
the title of philosophy. Gilson notes, however, holding that
"everything that either directly or indirectly undergoes the influence
of a religious faith ceases, ipso facto, to retain any philosophical
value," really stems from and represents "a mere 'rationalist'
postulate, directly opposed to reason." (The Spirit of Medieval
Philosophy, p. 406)
Despite their differences, Neo-Thomist or neo-Scholastic opponents of
Christian philosophy also shared several key similarities with
rationalists. As Gilson points out, neo-Scholastics retain some role
for Christian faith, but one extrinsic to their philosophical
activity:
[A]ll of them agree with Saint Thomas that truth cannot contradict
truth and that, consequently, what faith finds agrees substantially
with what reason proves. They would even go further, for if faith
agrees with reason, if not in its method, at least in its content, all
factual disagreement between the two is an indication of an error in
the philosophical order and a warning that one has to reexamine the
problem. Still, all of the neo-Scholastic philosophers add that,
insofar as philosophy, philosophy is the exclusive work of reason.
(Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p. 42)
The philosophy of the Christian, in their view, ought not to
incorporate anything deriving from Christianity into itself, for then
it passes over into theology. The neo-Scholastic position in effect
adopts wholesale rationalist assumptions about human reason,
philosophy and Christian faith, with the consequence that
[a]ccording to these neo-Scholastic philosophers, there cannot be
Christian philosophy any more than there can be for a pure
rationalist, because within the philosophical order, grasped with
precision and insofar as philosophical, their rationalism is a pure
one. (Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p. 42)
b. Theologist (Fideist) Positions
No thinker ascribing to Gilson's description of theologism
participated in the debates, with the possible exception of Lev
Shestov, whose 1937 Athens and Jerusalem (a portion of which was
published in 1935) may be described as advancing theologism. Still,
fideism exercised a role in the debates by providing a
counter-position to argue against. Gilson himself cited a number of
past examples, including Tertullian, Peter Damian, the Franciscan
spirituals, the Imitation of Christ's anonymous author, Martin Luther
and briefly discussed Karl Barth (Christianity and Philosophy, p.
44-48), remarking: "All the Barthian Calvinist asks of philosophy is
that it recognize itself as damned and remain in that condition"
(Christianity and Philosophy, p. 47).
Barth exercised considerable influence in Francophone Reformed
Christian circles, and his thought would figure heavily in later
1940s-50s Reformed Protestant discussions about Christian philosophy,
but he was not particularly well-known or engaged in French Catholic
circles at the time of the debates. His perspective on philosophy and
Christianity is clearly and rigorously fideist, holding that Christian
philosophy is an impossibility since philosophy and Christian
Revelation have essentially nothing in common. Philosophy, like human
reason, remains fundamentally incapable of addressing an absolutely
transcendent Christian revelation of Christ, which alone provides
knowledge of and relation to God:
There never actually has been a philosophia christiana, for if it
was philosophia it was not christiana, and if it was christiana it was
not philosophia. (Church Dogmatics, v. 1 , p. 6)
The existentialist Jewish philosopher Lev Shestov provides an example
of the theologist position, in which his central metaphor is the
opposition (stemming from the Genesis narrative) between the Tree of
Life, representing faith and human thought working by the guidance of
faith, and the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, identified with the
temptations of human reason and philosophy. According to Shestov,
important and basic dimensions of human existence are left behind,
reductively misconstrued, or overlooked by reason and philosophy. By
aiming at and striving for knowledge, philosophy attempts to draw
everything into a rationalist universal system of necessity and
restraint. Even when making autonomy a goal, philosophy turns out to
be unable to maintain itself and its drive to dominate all it
encounters within limits, so that it corrupts and distorts human
freedom and renders the human being unable to adequately understand
itself, God and faith.
Shestov criticizes Gilson specifically, summarizing the latter's
position as proposing
the revealed truth is founded on nothing, proves nothing, is
justified before nothing, and – despite this – is transformed in our
mind into a justified, demonstrated, self-evident truth. Metaphysics
wishes to possess the revealed truth and it succeeds in doing so.
(Athens and Jerusalem, p.271)
Shestov regards Gilson's position on Christian philosophy, and those
of the Medieval thinkers from whom Gilson takes inspiration, as more
sophisticated, and therefore more dangerous, versions of the same
rationalist movement involved in ancient and modern philosophy. As an
alternative, he proposes a "Biblical" or "Judeo-Christian philosophy,"
departing from norms of Western philosophy, accepting "neither the
fundamental problems nor the principles nor the technique of thought
of rational philosophy," open to and taking its direction from the
dimension of faith.
c. Rationalist Positions
Two major representatives of the rationalist position, the historian
of philosophy Emile Bréhier, and the idealist Léon Brunschvicg, became
directly involved in the Debates. Interestingly, while both argued
against the possibility of Christian philosophy, their positions
differed on basic assumptions about rationality. After presenting his
position prior to and early on in the debates, Bréhier never provided
responses to the arguments of his critics. In his later Raison et
Religion, Brunchscvicg revisited the issues, but made no new
contribution. By the middle stages of the Debates, the rationalists
dropped out of the discussion, which had turned to intra-Christian
(primarily intra-Catholic) issues.
Bréhier's concluded that "one can no more speak of a Christian
philosophy than of a Christian mathematics or a Christian physics,"
("Y-a-t'il une philosophie chrétienne?", p. 162) arriving at this via
two main argumentative strategies. Before examining these, two points
bearing on Bréhier's contribution to the debate require mention.
First, Bréhier suggests that "the difficulty here is more normative
than factual," and then writes decisively "[t]he question of the
existence of Christian philosophy can not be a pure question of fact."
("Y-a-t'il", p. 133-4). Judgment and resolution requires the
historian's active work of interpreting and discerning the
philosophical value and content of candidates for the legitimate title
of Christian philosophy. Second, he identifies reason, and rationality
as such, with an idealization of Greek philosophy:
For the Hellene, the true object of philosophy was to discover
order, or the cosmos: each being (and principally the directive forces
of nature, souls, and God) must be defined by the exact, and ne
varietur, place that it occupies in this eternal order. ("Y-a-t'il",
p. 134)
[T]he goal of Greek philosophy was to investigate the rational,
consequently immovable and fixed, order which is in things. The
universal Logos or Intelligence is only the metaphysical realization,
the projection of this need. It is, set up within the ideal, the very
order that the sensible world realizes more or less imperfectly.
("Y-a-t'il", p. 139-40)
Bréhier's first argumentative strategy took the form of a dilemma:
there are two possible ways of understanding Christian philosophy, and
adopting either one of these will lead to a rejection of Christian
philosophy as philosophy:
The word "Christian philosophy" seems to me to have two extremely
distinct senses….In a first sense, it exists, but it is of no interest
to philosophers; in a second sense, it would have interest for
philosophers if it did exist, but it does not exist. (Bul. Soc fr.
Phil., p. 49)
In the first sense, Christianity is determined by some dogmatic
authority, termed by Bréhier a "magisterium."
[T]he only way to know what is Christian and what is not Christian
is to consult those who say – and who have the right to say – what
Christian doctrine is….In this sense, I will call "Christian
philosophy" that which is in agreement with dogma, what the
magisterium accepts. I will call "non-Christian philosophy" that which
it rejects, and I will say that this question has not a bit of
importance or interest for the philosopher as philosopher. (Bul. Soc
fr. Phil., p. 50)
He provides two main and related reasons why the philosopher may set
this question aside. Besides the fact of the existence of numerous
Christian communities disagreeing on fundamental issues, the history
of the Catholic magisterium reveals
an absence of precise limit in the philosophical domain this
magisterium oversees, and a lack of consistency in its censure, and
these make Christian philosophy in the first sense seem to be
something completely arbitrary. (Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p. 50)
In addition, the mere condition of reason and philosophy being forced
in its exercise to submit to any authority sets
in place of the autonomy of reason that takes the initiative of
philosophical thought, the heteronomy of a reason completely incapable
of directing itself and knowing the scope of its own conclusions.
("Y-a-t'il", p. 150)
This irredeemably vitiates any Christian philosophy understood in the
first sense.
In the second sense, Christian philosophy would be a historically
observable case where Christianity has provided to philosophy a new
concept, method or direction. Arguing against this, Bréhier examined
the thought of the Church Fathers, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, 17th
Century Rationalists, 19th Century Traditionalists, Hegel and his
successors, and Maurice Blondel, to show that none of them are both
Christian and philosophical. The Church Fathers do not create a new
philosophy, but rather "annex everything they can from pagan
philosophy to Christianity" ("Y-a-t'il", p. 135). What is
philosophical in Augustine really comes from Plato and Plotinus, and
likewise Aquinas' philosophy is simply Aristotelianism, though marred
by an additional problem:
Saint Thomas' goal is to show the convergence of the two great
movements that dominate the spiritual history of our West, Greek
rationalism represented by Aristotle and Christian faith. One can only
speak of convergence if each of these two movements has its own
initiative, its own internal development: but, reason no longer
possesses its own initiative once the results of its own activity are
judged by a criterion that is foreign to it, by faith ("Y-a-t'il", p.
144).
The 17th Century Rationalists develop a natural theology, but in the
process dispense with any distinctive dependence on Christianity,
while the Traditionalists render reason so entirely dependent on
Christianity that
If 'reason' still retains some value, it is under the condition of
not wanting to be anything more than a form of tradition, and its
oldest aspect. This Christian philosophy, the better to dominate
reason, annexes it thus into revelation ("Y-a-t'il", p. 156)
Hegelianism rationalizes religion by absorbing it into philosophy, and
eventually culminates in Feuerbach's philosophical but atheist
humanism. Bréhier then brings his review to a close in criticizing
Blondel on two counts. First, the problem of action central to
Blondel's work has no intrinsic connection with Christianity. Second,
Blondel's work is really just an example of Christian apologetics
rather than philosophy.
In contrast to Bréhier's wholesale and unconvincing dismissal of any
historical influence of Christianity on philosophy, Brunschvicg
provides a more nuanced, though still largely negative, perspective on
Christian philosophy. While acknowledging from the start that "I would
not recognize myself in what I think and what I feel if the entire
movement of Christianity had not existed," (Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p. 73)
he would sharpen the debates' question into that of "a specifically
Christian philosophy" (Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p. 73). His answer takes
form within the general assumptions of Brunschvicg's evolutionary and
idealist philosophy of rationality's development.
In his view, rationality and philosophy emerge from originally
religious backgrounds, but become progressively freed from religion
and immature forms of rationality. True spirituality is to be
discovered in philosophy, since religion and religious thought provide
only its symbols.
[W]e come back to the position that I have called, granted very
naively, that of the Western consciousness, which is prior by five
centuries to the blossoming of Christianity. From that point of view,
faith, insofar as faith, is only the prefiguration, the sensible
symbol, the approximation of what properly human effort will be able
to set in full light. We understand then how one can recognize that
philosophy exists, and Christianity exists, without having the right
to conclude that a Christian philosophy would exist (Bul. Soc fr.
Phil., p. 74-5).
Brunschvicg's rationalist perspective eliminates one key aspect of the
problem Christian philosophy poses for his Christian interlocutors. He
holds that revelation is not really revelation, since what
philosophy's gradually ascending progress has revealed is that there
is in reality no supernatural: Christian or otherwise. He also
eliminates from consideration all pre-17th century philosophies as
candidates for Christian philosophy, arguing that from the vantage of
the present, the types of rationality developed prior to the 17th
century were immature, and thus not adequately philosophical.
Significantly, while this would disqualify Augustine's or Aquinas'
thought (though not Hegel's or Blondel's) from being Christian
philosophies, it would likewise disqualify the ancient conception of
reason upon which Bréhier's critique entirely relies.
There are three possible relations between a thinker's philosophy and
Christianity in Brunschvicg's view. If one is primarily a philosopher
and secondarily a Christian, it is not really Christian philosophy,
just philosophy. Likewise if one is primarily a Christian and
secondarily a philosopher, it is not really Christian philosophy.
Pascal provides an example of this, where "his Christianity has truly
taken possession of the entire man… by uncovering for him a way of
philosophizing that is not that of philosophers" (Bul. Soc fr. Phil.,
76). There is a third possibility
where we would have to recognize that there is something it would
be appropriate to call, without equivocation and without compromise, a
Christian philosophy. This is the case where a metaphysician,
reflecting in a manner deep and "naive" at the same time, would arrive
at that conviction that philosophy ends up only posing problems,
entangling itself in difficulties. The clearer a consciousness it will
have of these problems, the deeper it will sound the abyss into which
these difficulties throw philosophy, the more it will be persuaded
that only Christianity's own solutions will satisfy philosophical
problems. (Bul. Soc fr. Phil., 76).
Brunschvicg identifies this possibility with Malebranche (arguably,
Blondel would also fit this description), and concedes to him
the privilege and the honor of being the representative, naturally
not the sole representative, but the typical and essential
representative of a Christian philosophy (Bul. Soc fr. Phil., 76).
d. Neo-Scholastic Positions
Certain neo-Scholastic philosophers and theologians (in particular
those representing the Louvain school), while regarding Thomism as the
truest and most adequate philosophy available, argued against the
possibility or desirability of an explicitly Christian philosophy.
Several concerns marked their position, not least of which was
maintaining strict distinction between the disciplines of philosophy
and theology, whose formulation in their eyes was a central
accomplishment of Thomas Aquinas' thought. Philosophy was to be,
indeed could only be, an activity deriving from and employing only
purely natural reason, evidence and principles, distinct from theology
in which Christian revelation and faith play a role. Neo-Scholastics
worried over any implication that human reason might not be
essentially the same in the non-believer as in the believer,
especially since this would seem to render discussion and comparison
with non-Christian philosophies problematic. Their rallying point was
the view that Thomism was a genuine philosophy precisely because it
was a purely rational philosophy, independently arriving at
coincidence with the truths of Christian faith and doctrine.
Pierre Mandonnet adopted the most extreme position, arguing at the
1933 Société Thomiste meeting for a historical interpretation
reminiscent of Bréhier's:
Certainly Christianity has transformed the world, but it has not
transformed philosophy….Certainly Christianity has been a considerable
factor of progress in humanity, but not progress of a philosophical
order. Progress in the philosophical order does not take place by
Scripture but by reason….Progress in philosophy therefore does not
take place by the paths of religion. Even if there had been neither
Revelation nor Incarnation, there would have been development of
science and of thought. (La philosophie chrétienne: Juvisy, 11
Septembre 1933, p. 67-8)
He granted that one might speak of Christian philosophy as "a
Christian philosophical product," i.e., the product of the
philosophical activity of philosophers who happen to be Christian.
But, this will be a purely personal matter. They have their
reasons when they philosophize; they have their reasons for being
Christian. The unity is in the subject, who finds himself being a
believer and a philosopher; it is not in the work that they produce.
(p. 63)
At any rate, Mandonnet avers, the purported Christian philosopher will
not be engaging in philosophy, but rather a theology, which can
neither be unified with philosophy, nor be made comprehensible to
non-believers.
Léon Noël's position, articulated through recourse both to Aquinas'
thought and to Husserlian phenomenology, demonstrates more flexibility
than Mandonnet's, and distinguishes between two points of view: that
of the systematic philosopher, and that of the genesis of a
philosophical system. From the former, in its exposition, a philosophy
must be entirely rational, free from faith, so that it "rest[s] only
on evidence" and remains "purely philosophical, communicable to any
other mind, even if it be an unbelieving one, and able to be discussed
on the common ground of certainties which all grant." ("La notion de
philosophie chrétienne", p. 340). From the latter, Christianity can
orient or aid the process of study, the development of a philosophical
position or doctrine, and does so in and for the individual
philosopher:
Christian doctrines do not enter as such into the objective
exposition of a philosophy, or then that philosophy would cease to be
a philosophy. They cannot serve as such for the basis of a reasoning.
But their presence in the mind of the believer can orient the research
with a new meaning. ("La notion", p. 339-40)
In this limited sense, regarding a philosophy whose historical
development took place through the influence of Christianity, Noël
grants, we can speak of a Christian philosophy, but this is a less
rigorous way of speaking and thinking. He maintains that the Christian
philosopher who has been aided by Christianity in his or her
philosophical research must then strive to remove any dependence on
Christian faith or doctrine in their philosophical system, so that it
is purely rational, as accessible to the non-believer as it is to his
religious counterpart. A "transcendent aspect" will remain in
Christian faith, life, and experience, and adequate study of this will
require "subordinating one's judgment to faith," but this will then
cross over the boundary from philosophy into theology. All the
philosopher can do, as a philosopher, is note this aspect's
"irreducibility to rational explanation" ("La notion de philosophie
chrétienne", p. 342).
Fernand Van Steenberghen makes points analogous to those made by Noël
and Mandonnet (though mildly criticizing the latter), agreeing with
them in regarding the term "Christian philosophy" as either the
product of, or liable to produce, misunderstandings.
There are Christian philosophers, because some Christians can give
themselves over to philosophical research, and because their
Christianity disposes them to give themselves over with perspicuity,
with prudence, with serenity; it helps them with working out a true
philosophy. To the degree that it is true, a philosophy is necessarily
compatible with Christianity, open to Christianity, utilizable by
Christianity and by theology; its content will be able to partially
coincide with that of revelation. But a philosophy will never be
"Christian" in the formal and rigorous sense. One can, doubtless,
speak of Christian philosophers in a purely material sense, to
designate philosophies that have been worked out by Christian
thinkers. But since the facts demonstrate the latent danger of this
usage, it would be better to avoid using an expression that, far from
illuminating anything, is a source of confusions and equivocations.
("La IIe journée d'études de la Société Thomiste et la notion de
'philosophie chrétienne'", p. 554)
Van Steenberghen made several additional points. Agreeing with Blondel
and Sertillanges in that philosophy's task is to extend itself as far
as it can to all of reality, he proposed the Philosophy of Religion in
place of Christian philosophy, which should include the sub-discipline
'Philosophy of Christianity'. He criticized Thomist proponents of
Christian philosophy, in particular Gilson, Maritain and Sertillanges,
for having "mix[ed] up things important to carefully distinguish"
philosophy and theology, and "the personal attitude of the Christian
philosopher and the method of philosophy…the psychological
coming-to-being of a science and its logical coming-to-being." ("La
IIe journée", p. 550-1)
4. Positions For Christian Philosophy
a. Etienne Gilson's Position
Etienne Gilson argued for Christian philosophy's legitimacy and
observable historical reality, and explored particular achievements of
Medieval Christian philosophies in depth. Contrary to Henri Gouhier's
critique in his work that "the dossier of the notion of 'Christian
philosophy' does not appear to present any change, any evolution" (p.
66), Gilson continued to revise his assessment of significant authors
during the Debates. Early on in the Debates, bringing up "Saint
Augustine's credo ut intelligam and Saint Anselm's fides quaerens
intellectum," he considered "these two formulas…the true definition of
Christian philosophy" (Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p. 48). He would later
revise his assessment, narrowing the scope of Christian philosophy
primarily to Thomism, construing Augustinianism as reflecting a
primacy of faith over reason (Reason and Revelation in the Middle
Ages, p. 17-33) and explicitly rejecting the Anselmian fides quaerens
intellectum, now seeing "in that formula, an exclusive ambition and
limitation, which forbids us from seeing in the definition of the
attitude of a Christian philosopher" ("Sens et nature de l'argument de
Saint Anselme," p. 49, note 2).
Gilson grabbed Bréhier's dilemma by its horns: "I will say that in my
view the Christian philosophy he thinks is not interesting at all but
does exist, does not exist, whereas the one he deems that it would be
interesting but does not exist, does exist" (Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p.
52). Historical examination indicates that the Catholic magisterium
(in Christianity and Philosophy, Gilson extends his purview to
Reformed and Lutheran positions) addresses philosophy in a more
complex manner than Bréhier's simplistic interpretation, so that there
never has been a philosophy simply dictated by a religious
magisterium. Whether Christianity has in fact made any positive
contributions to philosophy remains an open question requiring
thorough historical study, which directed Gilson to the existence of
Christian philosophies, particularly in the Middle Ages. "What I seek
in the notion of Christian philosophy is therefore a conceptual
translation of what I believe to be a historically observable object:
philosophy in its Christian state" (Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p. 73).
He also criticized Neo-Scholastic opponents of Christian philosophy
for unnecessarily "adopt[ing] the position of their opponents," but
also for assuming that
[i]n Thomism alone we have a system in which philosophic
conclusions are deduced from purely rational premises….Philosophy,
doubtless, is subordinate to theology, but, as philosophy, it depends
on nothing but its own proper method; based on human reason, owing all
of its truth to the self-evidence of its principles and the accuracy
of its deduction, it reaches an accord spontaneously and without
having to deviate in any way from its own proper path. (The Spirit of
Medieval Philosophy, p. 6)
Any relation between philosophy and Christianity, however, becomes
merely fortuitous and extrinsic. "Once reason, as regards its
exercise, has been divorced from faith, all intrinsic relation between
Christianity and philosophy becomes a contradiction" (The Spirit of
Medieval Philosophy, p. 7). What the Neo-Thomists had forgotten was
that "faith and reason are rooted in the unity of the concrete
subject." (Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p. 45-6)
Gilson also criticized another position, "philosophy of the concrete,"
rightly identifying this with Bergson and wrongly with Blondel. In his
view (and Maritain's, who would make similar criticisms) these
philosophies bore strong affinities with Augustinian positions and
were favorable to Christian philosophy, but as they were hostile to
conceptual articulation, they were liable to stray into theology or
apologetics. He also argues against a plausibly Blondelian position:
"[a] philosophy open to the supernatural would certainly be compatible
with Christianity, but it would not necessarily be a Christian
philosophy."
In order to defend the notion of Christian philosophy, simply noting
the existence of philosophies in which Christianity had made some
contribution was not sufficient, and Gilson was particularly concerned
to clarify Christian philosophy's nature, providing several
definitions of Christian philosophy:
I call Christian every philosophy which, although keeping the two
orders formally distinct, nevertheless considers the Christian
revelation as an indispensable auxiliary to reason….[T]he concept does
not correspond to any simple essence susceptible of abstract
definition; but corresponds much rather to a concrete historical
reality as something calling for description….[It] includes in its
extension all those philosophical systems which were in fact what they
were because a Christian religion existed and because they were ready
to submit to its influence. (The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, p. 37)
If philosophical systems exist, purely rational in their
principles and in their methods, whose existence is not explained
without the existence of the Christian religion, the philosophies that
they define merit the name of Christian philosophies. This notion does
not correspond to a concept of a pure essence, that of the philosopher
or that of the Christian, but to the possibility of a complex
historical reality: that of a revelation generative of reason. (Bul.
Soc fr. Phil., p. 39)
If there have been philosophies, i.e., systems of rational truths,
whose existence cannot be explained historically without taking
account of Christianity's existence, these philosophies should bear
the name of Christian philosophies…. For the relation between both
concepts to be intrinsic, it is not enough that a philosophy be
compatible with Christianity; it is necessary that Christianity have
played an active role in the very establishment of that philosophy.
(Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p. 46)
He also characterized the range, objects, and condition of Christian philosophy:
[T]he content of Christian philosophy is that body of rational
truths discovered, explored, or simply safeguarded, thanks to the help
that reason receives from revelation (The Spirit of Medieval
Philosophy, p. 35)
[T]he essential domain of Christian philosophy corresponds exactly
to the limits of natural theology, but accidentally, it exerts an
influence on almost the whole of philosophy (Christianity and
Philosophy, p. 131)
[E]very Christian philosophy will be traversed, impregnated,
nourished by Christianity as by a blood that circulates in it, or
rather, like a life that animates it. One will never be able to say
that here the philosophical ends and the Christian begins; it will be
integrally Christian and integrally philosophical or it will not be.
(Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p. 46)
Gilson's position made three additional contributions to understanding
the nature and the problem of Christian philosophy. First, he
repeatedly stresses that an aspect central to the problem of Christian
philosophy was the problem of the relations between faith and reason.
Second, he specifies that in the use of their reason and in the course
of their philosophical activity, past Christian philosophers drew upon
resources offered them by the Christian faith and revelation. One way
this took place was by ideas, e.g. those of creation ex nihilo, of God
as being, of personality, derived originally from the non-rational
religious source, then appropriated by Christian (as well as Jewish
and Muslim) thinkers, who fruitfully brought them into their
philosophical activity and systems. Christian philosophy represents
the philosophical activity of reason working on, and bringing
rationality to data derived originally from non-rational religious
sources.
[O]nce this philosopher is also a Christian, his reason's exercise
will be that of a Christian's reason, i.e., not a reason of a
different type than that of non-Christian philosophers, but a reason
that labors under different conditions….[I]t is true that his reason
is that of a subject in which there is something non-rational, his
religious faith….I ask especially whether the philosophical life is
not precisely a constant effort to bring what is irrational in us to
the state of rationality….What is peculiar to the Christian is being
convinced of the rational fertility of his faith and being sure that
this fertility is inexhaustible. (Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p. 47)
Third, he redirects focus from abstract ways of framing this problem
towards concrete philosophizing human subjects, in whom faith and
reason coexist, and who both engage in and are formed by philosophy
and Christianity. Gilson guardedly accepts the Augustinian position:
He knows that faith is faith and reason is reason, but he adds
that a man's faith and a man's reason are not two uncoordinated
accidents of the same substance. In his view, the real is the man
himself, a profound unity, not dissociable into juxtaposed elements as
fragments of a mosaic would be, a unity in which nature and grace,
reason and faith, cannot function each one on its own, like in a
mechanism whose pieces would have been purchased at the store as
separate parts. If therefore a Christian man philosophizes, and if he
expresses himself truly in his philosophy, this cannot fail to be a
Christian philosophy. (Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p. 45)
Gilson argues that this correctly reflects "the real unity of the
elements of the concrete in the subject where they are realized….If
there were a faith and a reason in us, whose being was radically
distinct from that of a thinking substance to which they belong, we
could not say of any of us that he was a man" (Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p.
45-6).
b. Jacques Maritain's Position
Maritain regarded his own position as a "doctrinal' (that is, strictly
philosophical) complement to Gilson's historically derived position.
Like Gilson, he criticized rationalist and neo-Scholastic opponents of
Christian philosophy, but also articulated fuller criticisms of
Blondel (An Essay on Christian Philosophy, p. 7-11, 55-61, Science and
Wisdom, p. 82-86). He agreed with Blondel on the mistake of Christian
thinkers calling for and generating a "separated philosophy," which he
regarded as "completely contrary to the spirit of Thomism" (Essay, p.
8), but saw three main flaws in Blondel's position. First, he rightly
notes the errors in Blondel's own critique based on reductive
misinterpretations of Gilson's position. Second, he charges Blondel
with a lack of clarity, blurring lines between philosophy and
theology, thus
transfer[ring] to the heart of a philosophy what holds true of an
apologetics…apologetics, by its own nature and essence presupposes the
solicitations of grace and the operations of the heart and will on the
part of the one who hears, and the light of faith already possessed on
the part of the one who speaks; philosophy by its nature and essence
exacts…only reason in the one who searches. (Essay, p. 9)
Third, admitting the "insufficiency of philosophy," Maritain rejects
Blondel's call for and project of "philosophy of insufficiency,"
making charges similar to Gilson's, that by critiquing conceptualism,
Blondel rejects concepts and objective knowledge.
Maritain's most important contribution was to frame the useful
distinction between the nature and the state of philosophy:
[W]e must distinguish between the nature of philosophy, or what it
is in itself, and the state in which it exists in real fact,
historically, in the human subject, and which pertains to its concrete
conditions of existence and exercise. (Essay, p. 11-2)
In its nature or essence, philosophy is "intrinsically a natural and
rational form of knowledge" (Essay, p. 14), entirely independent from
faith. As a form of knowledge, philosophy is specified by its
object(s): "within the realm of the real, created and uncreated…a
whole class of objects which are of their nature attainable through
the natural faculties of the human mind" (Essay, p. 14). In its
nature, however, philosophy is
a pure abstract essence. It is all too easy a matter to endow such
an abstraction with reality, to clothe it as such with a concrete
existence. An ideological monster results; such, in my opinion,
occurred in the case both of the rationalists and the neo-Thomists
whom Mr. Gilson has called to task (Essay, p. 14).
In its essence, philosophy is neither Christian nor non-Christian.
Turning to concrete states in which philosophy actually exists, it
becomes possible for a philosopher to be a Christian and for his or
her philosophy to be a Christian philosophy. On this basis, Maritain
supplies several characterizations of Christian philosophy. From the
start, he frames it as not "a simple essence, but a complex: an
essence grasped in a certain state" (Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p. 67), later
adding: "under conditions of performance, of existence and of life,
for or against which one is in fact obliged to make a choice" (Science
and Wisdom, p. 81). He clarifies:
Christian philosophy is not a determinate body of truths,
although, in my opinion, the doctrine of St. Thomas exemplifies its
amplest and purest form. Christian philosophy is philosophy itself in
so far as it is situated in those utterly distinctive conditions of
existence and exercise into which Christianity has ushered the
thinking subject, and as a result of which philosophy perceives
certain objects and validly demonstrates certain propositions, which
in any other circumstances would to a greater or lesser extent elude
it. (Essay, p. 30)
Maritain distinguishes two main ways in which Christianity aids the
activity of philosophy in concrete states: objective contributions and
subjective reinforcements. Christianity makes objective contributions
by supplying philosophy with data and ideas. Some of these "belong
within the field of philosophy, but….philosophers failed to recognize
[them] explicitly" (Essay, p. 18), e.g. the ideas of creation or of
sin. Others are "objective data which philosophy knew well but which
it approached with much hesitancy and which…was corroborated by
revelation" (Essay, p. 21). Even in cases of mysteries of the
Christian faith, philosophy develops further, as an instrument of
theology it "learn[s] many things whole being thus led along paths
which are not its own" (Essay, p. 22). It also has its field of
inquiry, its possible objects of study, expanded, as happened with
"speculation on the dogmas of the Trinity and the Incarnation,"
productive of "an awareness of the metaphysical problem of the person"
(Essay, p. 23).
Subjective reinforcements are the ways in which Christian faith and
practice concretely aid the philosophical activity of the human person
by putting them in a better condition to do philosophy. Though
strictly speaking these are numberless, Maritain identifies several
subjective reinforcements bearing on philosophy as a habitus, which
attains a better use when set in "synergy and vital solidarity, this
dynamic continuity of habitus" with theology (Essay, p. 27). Divine
grace also removes or ameliorates impediments to philosophizing well,
so that "the more the philosopher remains faithful to grace, the more
easily will he free himself of manifold futilities and opacities."
(Essay, p. 28)
c. Maurice Blondel's Position
Blondel, universally acknowledged by French commentators as the third
main proponent of Christian philosophy, developed a complex position
intimately connected with previous and later works, and resisting
brief summarization. Accordingly, only four main components of his
position are addressed here: his critique of rationalists and
Neo-Scholastics, his critique of Gilson, the philosophy of
insufficiency, history and the problem of the supernatural, and the
stages of Christian philosophy.
Since his early works (cf. the Letter on Apologetics), Blondel had
criticized the "separated philosophy" of certain Neo-Scholastics for
ignoring the problematic imposed on philosophy by the "religious
problem" (a meta-philosophical requirement for philosophy to fully
take Christianity into account without thereby rationalizing it). By
their care to exclude anything explicitly Christian from their
philosophizing while still desiring to generate philosophy
substantially in agreement with Christian theology, Neo-Scholastic
philosophy lapsed into a philosophically sterile "concordism" in which
philosophy and Christianity are only extrinsically related to each
other, but philosophical doctrines are nevertheless judged correct or
incorrect by their agreement with dogma. Blondel also took on Bréhier
directly, charging him with relying on his own "dogmatism imposing
itself by authority" ("Y-a-t'il", p. 601), characterized by a
reductive and rigid conception of reason and straw-man caricatures of
Christian thinkers Bréhier claimed to rationally critique. In this
way, "dogmatic rationalism becomes irrational and seems to mutilate
history just as much as philosophical speculation itself" ("Y-a-t'il",
p. 600). In particular, Bréhier's two criticisms of Blondel turn out
not only to be untrue, but also mutually inconsistent.
At much greater length and with greater severity, Blondel consistently
criticized Gilson's (and by implication, Maritain's) position. Though
incorrect (and uncharitable) in ascribing these to Gilson, Blondel's
identification and criticism of several errors in handling the problem
of Christian philosophy nevertheless retain their philosophical merit.
He diagnosed two main (meta-)philosophical mistakes: conceptualism and
historicism. Conceptualism maintains
philosophical doctrines, as different as they may be, ultimately
aim at sealing themselves off in closed, sufficient, and exclusive
systems; these systems organize themselves with and terminate in
concepts, and all that does not succeed in being raised into concepts
repulses philosophy. (Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p.87-8)
This reduces philosophy to an abstract, static construction of
concepts, hampering philosophy from engaging its full range of
objects, obscuring that
this is precisely what is in question: can it not be
philosophical, is it not "conceivable", is it not even normal, that
philosophy opens ulterior perspectives…orients and stimulates
spiritual life's dynamism by posing inevitable problems whose complete
solution it does not provide, even though it serves to not allow them
to be misunderstood nor falsely resolved? (Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p. 88)
What Blondel terms "historicism" reflects attempts to resolve the
problem of Christian philosophy through direct appeal to the
discipline of history (or history of philosophy). This introduces a
dilemma, however, "doubly compromising both to Philosophy and to the
Christian Revelation":
[I]f history as an intermediary, provides data taken from
Christianity in a mixture of public facts or of private experiences to
the laboratory of philosophical reflection, it is by forcibly
stripping the data of their supernatural originality; it accepts them,
puts them into its mill, experiments on them in its own natural and
rational activity. (Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p. 89)
Inversely, by wanting to integrate dogmas, ideas, ascetic
practices, mystical experiences coming to it from outside within
itself, philosophy that would not have preliminarily opened in itself
this empty space of which we spoke, by its very care not to alter the
supernatural character of Christian data, introduces a foreign body
into its flesh, a packet of incurably wounding spines. (Bul. Soc fr.
Phil., p. 89)
His reference to the "empty space" leads into Blondel's positive
conception of Christian philosophy, which will be in part "an open
philosophy…recogniz[ing] its limits by being ready to accept ulterior
data" (Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p. 90). This will be a philosophy of
insufficiency, i.e., philosophy that thematizes philosophy's own
insufficiency to fully comprehend, rationally articulate, and
systematize its own objects, the ranges of realities to which it
extends, and the human subject engaged in philosophizing. It will also
acknowledge that philosophy's own intrinsic requirement of autonomy
culminates in philosophy freely allowing itself to be further
determined, guided and shaped by something transcending philosophy.
Against conceptualism, Blondel proposes another possibility:
must philosophy end up, whatever the level of its development may
be, in recognizing how it is normally incomplete, how it opens in
itself and before itself an empty space prepared not only for its own
ulterior discoveries and on its own ground, but for illuminations and
contributions whose real origin it is not and cannot become?…[I]t is
this second thesis, philosophically definable and supportable, i.e.
without proceeding from a revelation, that is alone in spontaneous and
deep agreement with Christianity. Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p. 90)
He expands the metaphor, employing similar terminology, e.g.:
[a] gap coming from above (Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p. 91)
[the] interior open space or the silence of the soul (Bul. Soc fr.
Phil., p. 91)
infinitesimal and real fissures, 'holes' that require being filled
and which admit consequently the presence or even the need of another
reality, of a heterogeneous and complementary datum. ("Le problème de
la philosophie catholique," p. 43)
These spaces occur throughout the fabric of philosophical thought.
There are "relations of emptiness and fullness where two
incommensurable orders unfold themselves," (Le problème de la
philosophie chrétienne, p. 147) within the same concrete human
subject. These spaces are not simply philosophical voids:
[W]e do not remain in the presence of a black hole, of an ocean
for which neither ship nor sail would seem possible. The empty space
that we spoke of earlier is not a chimerical fiction, projection of
restlessness, sickness of the soul. It has…contours to discern, a
reason for being to meditate on and to render rationally admissible,
an attractive and imperious character. (Bul. Soc fr. Phil., p. 90)
Blondel's attitude towards history and Christian philosophy is
considerably more complex than a simple rejection. From within the
perspective generated and secured by a philosophy of insufficiency,
appeal to history and reinterpretation of historical examples of
Christian philosophy becomes legitimate. History in fact displays a
"chronic condition" in which philosophy and Christianity generate
"incessant antagonisms or the renewed efforts of
compenetration…throughout the ages." This condition "possesses an
intelligible signification", and it is "philosophy's role to seek out
its causes and to discern its enduring reasons." ("Le problème," p.
14) In modernity and through modern thought, the most fundamental
aspect of the problem of Christian philosophy come to light. Previous,
ultimately unsuccessful, attempts at Christian philosophies have made
"the very conception of philosophy evolve….preparing discernment of
what remains incommensurable between the rational order and the
supernatural order." ("Le problème," p. 17) in the end
bringing the always looming crisis between rational autonomy and
Christian demands to a vital point that historical, exegetical, and
apologetic considerations do not reach, insofar as they appear in
isolation without the preliminary question being raised, the question
whose precise meaning, normal character, and essential scope we have
just tried to exhibit. ("Le problème ," p. 18-9)
This central question is the "problem of the supernatural" and
Christian philosophy has to self-consciously grapple with,
conceptualize, and bring about a condition involving:
[n]either dependence nor independence nor simple juxtaposition of
the rational order and the Christian order; but a type of
heterogeneity in compenetration and of symbiosis in the very
incommensurability. (Le problème, p. 145)
In Le problème de la philosophie chrétienne (cf. also "Pour une
philosophie intégrale", p. 57-62), Blondel explicitly construed
Christian philosophy as a three-stage set of projects correlated to
several states or conditions of human being. Among these is a "a state
of nature that actually could subsist, but which also actually has
never existed for humanity in the historical and concrete order," (Le
problème, p. 25) i.e. actually an abstraction. The others include
those of "original justice," and of "decay," the "transnatural state,"
and the state in which "a person is introduced into the supernatural
order." (Le problème, p. 25-27)
Each state is a possible object of study for philosophy. Corresponding
to the state of nature, "essential philosophy" (that is, philosophy of
insufficiency) systematically examines necessary and possible
conditions and structures of human thought and action. At this stage,
philosophy becomes critically aware of its own insufficiencies, and
human reason is brought to recognition, opening, and orientation
towards the "empty space" but not yet to determinately entering it.
The second stage, in which philosophy enters the opened space seeking
the supernatural, involves a second philosophical project: "a sort of
mixed philosophy, a philosophy of the possible relations…between
essential possibilities or necessities and realizable contingents."
(Le problème, p. 167). In the third philosophical project, philosophy
engages what Christianity teaches to be humanity's and all other
created being's real condition, becoming reoriented and expanded in
the process. At this stage, it becomes possible "to study the
repercussions in natural man of the different states – transnatural,
supernatural or rebel – that awaken in consciousness and the will data
or reactions other than those of a pure state of nature." (Le
problème, p. 171)
d. Gabriel Marcel's Position
In his position on Christian philosophy, Marcel harmonized the
positions, believed incompatible by their authors, of Gilson and
Maritain on one side, and Blondel on the other. He also made enough
original contributions of his own to justify interpreting his position
as a fourth main position for Christian philosophy. One of these
contributions was raising an additional problem for rationalist or
neo-Scholastic opponents of Christian philosophy:
If it was admitted that Christianity has had no positive influence
on philosophical development, this would entail saying that it has
never actually been able to be thought – for there is no thought
worthy of that name that does not contribute to transforming all the
other thoughts….To say that Christianity has never been thought is to
let it be understood that it is not thinkable. ("A propos de L'esprit
de la Philosophie médiévale par M. E. Gilson," p. 309)
While praising Gilson's The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, Marcel
argued, in terms similar to Blondel's, that
[t]he contribution here is a certain datum – a revealed datum –
whose signification, whose value is absolutely transcendent to any
experience susceptible of being constituted on purely human bases.
There is the paradox, the scandal, if you like. I would be disposed
for my part, to think that there is Christian philosophy only there
where this paradox, this scandal is not only admitted or even
accepted, but embraced with a passionate and unrestricted gratitude.
From the moment on when, to the contrary, philosophy seeks by some
procedure to attenuate this scandal, to mask the paradox, to reabsorb
the revealed datum in a dialectic of pure reason or mind, to this
precise degree it ceases to be a Christian philosophy ("A propos", p.
311-2)
The paradox or scandal Marcel regards as most central to Christian
philosophy is the Incarnation, which bears important implications for
philosophy and reason itself.
Perhaps it would not be abusive to claim that the essence of such
a philosophy is a meditation on that datum's implications and
consequences of every order, not only unpredictable but contrary to
reason's superficial demands from the very start wrongly posing
themselves as inviolable. But, the essential function of metaphysical
reflection will consist in critiquing these demands in the name of
higher demands, and consequently in the name of a superior reason that
faith in the Incarnation puts precisely in the condition of becoming
fully conscious of itself. ("A propos", p. 312)
He adds that "the central light residing in the Incarnation radiates
in reality through all of the regions of metaphysics" ("A propos", p.
312), generating the historical examples of Christian philosophy
Gilson studied and identified in his works. Christian philosophy, as
Marcel envisioned it, has the task not only of noting cases where
Christianity has exerted a generative effect on philosophy, but also
of investigating how this is possible. This, in turn, requires that
"our reason – a created reason ordered to the intelligence of created
nature – must, in deepening itself, recognize what in it exceeds the
domain of adequacy to itself" ("A propos", p. 1305).
e. Other Positions Reconciling the Gilson-Maritain and Blondel Positions
Although numerous philosophers have accepted the verdict of
fundamental incompatibility between the Gilson-Maritain and Blondel
positions, many participants in and commentators on the debates early
on saw not only compatibility but even complementarity between their
positions, among them Antonin Sertillanges, Bruno De Solages, Aimé
Forest, and Henri De Lubac (all of whom were Thomists). Asserting this
involved not only arguing compatibility between the positions on
Christian philosophy, but also interpreting Thomism as being
compatible with the requirements of Blondel's non-Thomist philosophy.
De Solages likens Gilson's, Maritain's and Blondel's positions on
Christian philosophy to three different paths climbing the same
mountain:
None of the three lead to the same peak, for our mountain has
three peaks, but it seems to me that the view that one has from each
of them marvelously completes the view that one has from the others,
and that all three allow one to make for oneself a sufficiently
complex and exact idea of this complex reality. ("Le problème de la
philosophie chrétienne," p. 232)
De Lubac, drawing from De Solages and Sertillanges, provides a classic
account reconciling Blondel with Gilson and Maritain, as well as
noting certain differences between the latter two.
If we believe Maritain and Gilson, their two positions come
together, one in treating the problem from the historical point of
view and the other. In practice, however, Gilson, who is the better
historian, admits a greater influence than Maritain concedes…. [O]nly
the third thesis, that of Blondel, establishes a truly intrinsic
relationship between rational speculation and supernatural revelation,
without, for all that, opening to philosophy the mysterious content of
this revelation. ("Retrieving the Tradition: On Christian Philosophy",
p.482-3)
He distinguishes several different distinguishable types of Christian
philosophy:
[T]here is another sense in which one can and must speak of a
Christian philosophy…a sense no longer historical but metaphysical. It
is, then, no longer a matter of a philosophy, or of philosophies,
which, in fact, find themselves to be Christian because they have
received a Christian contribution…Instead, it is a question of the
philosophy, which, to be truly and integrally philosophy, must, in a
certain way, be Christian. ("Retrieving the Tradition", p 486)
The relationship between these types is not one of opposition or
exclusion, but one going beyond even compatibility or complementarity
to mutual requirement. The Gilson-Maritain position needs to be
completed and self-critically secured by the Blondelian one: "[T]o the
double recognition of the subjective comforts and the objective
contributions which philosophy owes to Christianity, it is
indispensable to add the elaboration of a philosophy of
insufficiency." Additionally, "posing the problem of the relationship
between supernatural mystery and the reason it fertilizes, leads us to
look for another more comprehensive meaning of Christian philosophy."
("Retrieving the Tradition", p. 494-5) Blondel's thought is possible,
however, only on the unacknowledged basis of the type of Christian
philosophy Gilson and Maritain focused on:
[I]f we speak concretely, psychologically, and historically, we
will say that this absolute Christian philosophy presupposes the first
kind of Christian philosophy, which is completely contingent. We add
that it presupposes this contingent Christian philosophy as already
established and developed for enough time to have profoundly
penetrated the understanding and to have laid bare the secret law.
("Retrieving the Tradition," p. 488)
5. References and Further Reading
This selective bibliography provides reference to only a portion of
the literature either from or about the debates about Christian
philosophy, positions developed, and issues involved. For more
extensive bibliographies, cf. Bernard Badoux, O.F.M., "Quaestio de
philosophia christiana," Antonianum, vol. 11, p. 487-552; and Luigi
Bogliolo. La Filosophia Cristiana: Il problema, la storia, la
struttura (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana. 1986). All translations
from the French, unless otherwise noted in the bibliography, are the
author's.
a. Literature from the 1930s Christian Philosophy Debates
This list includes two types of literature: 1) books, articles, and
conference reports directly part of the debates; 2) books, articles,
and conference reports subsequent to the debates in which the
positions of these participants are further developed. Many other
documents not listed here, of lesser importance or centrality, also
form part of the debates.
* "La notion de philosophie chrétienne", Session of 21 March 1931,
Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie, v. 31. Includes:
o Main Presentation by Etienne Gilson
Presentations by Emile Bréhier, Jacques Maritain, Léon
Brunschvicg, Edouard Le Roy, and Raymond Lenoir
Discussion between Gilson, Bréhier, and Brunschvicg
Letters from Maurice Blondel and Jacques Chevalier
* La philosophie chétienne: Juvisy, 11 Septembre 1933 (Account of
the 2nd Day of Studies of the Société Thomiste). (Paris: Cerf. 1933)
Includes:
o M.D. Chenu, O. P. "Allocation d'Ouverture"
Aimé Forest, "Le problème historique de la philosophie chrétienne"
A.R. Motte, "Vers une solutions doctrinale du problème de
la philosophie chrétienne"
Discussion by numerous members of the Société Thomiste,
including substantive presentations made by Festugière, Etienne
Gilson, Pierre Mandonnet, Antonin Sertillanges, Daniel Feuling,
Masnovo, Cochet,
Appendix: Correspondence from Jacques Maritain, M.E.
Baudin, Roland-Gosselin, O.P. , M.G. Rabeau
* Blondel, Maurice, "Autonomie normale et connexion réelle de la
philosophie et de la religion," in Library of the 10th international
congress of philosophy (Amsterdam 1948). Amsterdam : North Holland,
1948, vol. 1, p. 207-208
* —–, "La philosophie ouverte" in Henri Bergson: Essais et
témoignages inédits. Albert Béguin, Pierre Thévenaz, eds. (Neuchâtel:
Baconnière. 1941), p. 73-90
* —–,"Le centre de perspective où il faut se placer pour que la
philosophie catholique soit concevable." Archivio di filosofia, vol.
2, no. 2, p. 3-15 (1932).
* —–, "Le devoir intégral de la philosophie" in Actas del primer
congreso nacional de filosofia (1949). (Mendoza, Argentina: Univ.
Nacional de Cuyo. 1950), vol. 2, p. 884-889.
* —–,Le problème de la philosophie catholique (Paris: Bloud & Gay. 1932)
* —–,"Le problème de la philosophie catholique: Seance of 26 Nov
1932", Les Etudes Philosophiques vol. 7, no. 1.
o Includes letters and discussion by: Enrico Castelli, Jean
Delvolvé, Henri Gouhier, Joseph Maréchal, S.J, Jacques Palliard,
Gaston Berger
* —–,"Office du philosophe", Revue Thomiste, vol. 19, p. 587-592 (1936).
* —–,"Philosophie et Christianisme," Vie Intellectuelle, 25 Jan
1940, p. 96-105.
* —–,"Pour la philosophie integrale", Revue néoscholastique de
Philosophie, vol. 37, p. 49-64. (1934).
* —–,"Réponse irénique à des méprises : Comment comprendre et
justifier l'accès à la vie surnaturelle?"Giornale di metafisica vol.
3, p. 44-48 (1948).
* —–,(under the pseudonym "X"), "Une philosophie chrétienne
est-elle rationallement concevable? Est-elle historiquement réalisé?
Etat actuel de ce debat", Revue des Questions Historiques, vol. 116,
p. 389-393 (1932).
* —–, "Y-a-t'il une philosophie chrétienne?", Revue de
Métaphysique et de Morale, vol 38, no.4 (1931).
* Borne, Etienne. "D'une 'Philosophie Chrétienne' qui serait
philosophique," Esprit, November 1932, p. 335-340.
* Bréhier, Emile. "Comment je comprends l'histoire de la
philosophie," Etudes Philosophiques, p. 105-13 (1947). Reprinted in
Etudes de philosophie antique (Paris: PUF. 1955), p. 1-9.
* —–,"Y-a-t'il une philosophie chrétienne?" Revue de Métaphysique
et de la Morale, vol. 38 no. 2, p. 133-162 (1931).
* Brunschvicg, Léon, "De la vraie et fausse conversion," (parts
1-2) Revue de Métaphysique et de la Morale., vol. 38 no. 1, p. 29-60,
n. 2, p. 187-235. All parts later published as De la vraie et de la
fausse conversion: suivi de La querelle de l'athéisme (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France. 1951)
* —– , "Religion et Philosophie", Revue de la Métaphysique et de
la Morale, vol. 42, no. 1, p. 1-13. (1935).
* —– , La Raison et la Religion (Paris: Felix Alcan. 1939)
* Chestov, Léon. "Athènes et Jérusalem (Concupiscentia
irresistibilis)", Revue Philosophique, vol. 120, p. 305-349. Later
becomes part 3 of Athènes et Jérusalem (Paris. 1937)
* Gilson, Etienne.. "Autour de la philosophie chrétienne. La
spécificité de l'ordre philosophique", La Vie Intellectuelle, vol. 21,
no. 3, p. 404-424. Translated as "Concerning Christian Philosophy: the
Distinctiveness of the Philosophic Order" in Philosophy and history:
Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1936), p.
61-76.
* —– ,Christianisme et Philosophie. (Paris: Vrin. 1936).
Translated as Christianity and Philosophy by Ralph MacDonald, C.S.B.
(New York: Sheet & Ward. 1939).
* —– , Elements of Christian Philosophy. (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday: 1960).
* —– , History of Christian philosophy in the Middle Ages (New
York: Random House, 1955).
* —– , "La possibilité philosophique de la philosophie
chrétienne", Revue des sciences religieuses, vol. 32.
* —–,Introduction à la Philosophie Chrétienne. (Paris: Vrin, 1960)
translated by Armand Maurer as Christian Philosophy: An Introduction
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. 1993).
* —– , L'esprit de la Philosophie médiévale. Translated by A.H.C.
Downes as The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy (Gifford Lectures
1931-1932) (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1936).
* —– , "Le christianisme et la tradition philosophique," Sciences
Philosophiques et Théologiques, vol. 20, p. 249-266. (1941).
* —–, Le Philosophe et la Théologie (Paris: Fayard. 1960)
Translated by Cecile Gilson as The Philosopher and Theology (New York:
Random House. 1962).
* —– ,Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages. (New York: Scribner's. 1938)
* —– , The Unity of Philosophical Experience. (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1937)
* —– , "What is Christian Philosophy?" in A Gilson Reader. Anton
Pegis, ed. (Garden City, NY: Hanover House, 1957) p. 177-191
* de Lubac, Henri. "Sur la philosophie chretienne, reflexions a la
suite d'un debat", Nouvelle Revue Théologique, vol. 63, no. 3, p.
125-53, English translation: "Retrieving the Tradition: On Christian
Philosophy", Communio, vol. 19, p. 478-506 (1992).
* Marc, André, S.J. "La philosophie chrétienne et la théologie",
La Vie Intellectuelle, vol. 24, p. 21-27(1933).
* Marcel, Gabriel. "A propos de L'esprit de la Philosophie
médiévale par M. E. Gilson", Nouvelle Revue des Jeunes, vol. 4, no. 3,
p. 308-315 (1932).
* ——, "A propos de L'esprit de la Philosophie médiévale par M. E.
Gilson", Nouvelle Revue des Jeunes, vol. 4, no. 12, p. 1302-1309
(1932).
* ——,"Position du mystère ontologique et ses approches concrètes",
Les Etudes Philosophiques, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 95-102 (with responses by
Blondel and Bréhier). Later translated in Being and Having: An
Existentialist Diary. Trans. Katherine Farrer. (New York: Harper.
1965) p.116-121.
* Maritain, Jacques, Approches sans entraves. (Paris:
Fayard.1973). Translated as Untrammeled Approaches (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press. 1997).
* ——, "A propos de la philosophie chrétienne," translated as
"About Christian Philosophy," in The Human Person and the World of
Values Balduin Schwarz, ed. (New York: Fordham University. Press.
1960), p. 1-11.
* ——, "De la notion de philosophie chrétienne", Revue
néo-scolastique de philosophie, vol. 36, p. 153-86. (1932).
* ——, Essai sur la philosophie chrétienne Translated as An Essay
on Christian Philosophy, by Edward Flannery (New York: Philosophical
Library. 1955)
* ——, Raison et raisons, essais détachés (Paris: Egloff. 1948)
later expanded and translated as The Range of Reason (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons. 1952).
* ——, Science et sagesse, suivi d'éclaircissements sur ses
frontières et son objet (Paris: Téqui. 1935). translated by Bernard
Wall as Science and Wisdom (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940)
* Noël, Léon. "La notion de philosophie chrétienne," Revue
néoscholastique de Philosophie, vol. 37 (1934).
* Sertillanges, Antonin D., O.P."De la philosophie chrétienne", La
Vie Intellectuelle, vol. 24. no. 1, p. 9-20 (1933).
* ——,"L'apport philosophique du Christianisme d'après M. Etienne
Gilson", La Vie Intellectuelle, vol. 14, p. 386-402 (1932).
* ——, Le Christianisme et les philosophies (Paris: Aubier. 1939)
* de Solages, Bruno "Le problème de la philosophie chrétienne," La
Vie Intellectuelle, vol. 25, no. 3, p. 215-228 (1933).
* Van Steenberghen, Fernand. "Etienne Gilson: historian de la
pensée médievale", Revue Philosophique de Louvain, vol. 77, p. 487-508
(1979).
* —–, Etudes philosophiques (Longueuil, Canada: Le Préambule. 1980)
* —–, Histoire de la philosophie; période chrétienne. (Paris:
Nauwelaerts, 1964)
* —–, Introduction à l'étude de la philosophie médiévale (Paris,
Béatrice-Nauwelaerts. 1974)
* —–, "L'interpretation de la pensée médievale au cours du siècle
écoulé," Revue Philosophique de Louvain, vol. 49, p. 108-19 (1951).
* —–, "La IIe journée d'études de la Société Thomiste et la notion
de 'philosophie chrétienne'", Revue néoscholastique de Philosophie,
vol. 35, p. 539-554 (1933).
* —–, "La Philosophie de S. Augustin d'après les travaux du
centenaire", Revue Néoscholastique, vol. 35, pp. 106-127, 231-281
(1933).
* —–, "Philosophie et christianisme: Épilogue d'un débat ancien",
Revue Philosophique de Louvain, v. 86 (1988).
b. Selected Literature from 1940s and 50s Reformed Protestant
Discussions about Christian Philosophy
* Le problème de la philosophie chrétienne (Paris: P.U.F. 1949), includes :
o Jean Boisset, "Introduction"
Edmond Rochedieu, "Philosophie chrétienne et vérité théologique"
Paul Ricouer, "Le renouvellement du problème de la
philosophie chrétienne par les philosophies de l'existence"
Paul Arbouse-Bastide, "Les voies de la raison et la voie de l'amour"
Jacques Bois, "Unité du christianisme et de la philosophie"
Maurice Neeser, "La théologie chrétienne peut-elle
prétendre à une place dans l'organisme des sciences humaines?"
* Bois, Jacques, "Philosophie et Religion" (1st part), Études
Théologiques et religieuses, Nov. (1933).
* —–, "Philosophie et Religion" (2nd part), Études Théologiques et
religieuses, vol. 9, no. 1, p. 35-49 (1934).
* Guérin, Pierre. "A propos de la philosophie chrétienne", Revue
d'Histoire et de Philosophie religeuses, p. 210-242. (1935)
* —–,"La condition du philosophe chrétien", Revue de Théologie et
de Philosophie, vol. 37, p. 65-78. (1949).
* Mehl, Roger. "Die Philosophie vor der Théologie," Theologische
Literaturzeitung, no. 10, p. 586-90 (1950).
* —–,Le condition du philosophe chrétien. (Paris: Niestlé. 1947)
Translated as The Condition of the Christian philosopher by Eva
Kushner (Philadelphia: Fortress Press. 1963).
* Reymond, A. "Philosophie et théologie dialectique", Revue de
Théologie et de Philosophie, v. 33, p. 255-281. Later published in
Philosophie spiritualiste.
* Ricouer, Paul. "Le renouvellement du problème de la philosophie
chrétienne par les philosophiques de l'existence," in Les Problèmes de
la Pensèe Chrétienne, vol. 4: Le Problème de la Philosophie Chrétienne
(Paris: 1949), p. 43-67.
* —–,"l'Homme de Science at l'Homme de Foi", in Récherches et
Débats: Pensée Scientifique et foi chrétienne, vol. 4 (1953)
* Souriau, Michel, "Qu'est-ce qu'une philosophie chrétienne?"
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, vol 39, no. 3, p. 353-385 (1932)
* Thévenaz, Pierre. "De la philosophie divine à la philosophie
chrétienne," Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie, vol. 1, p. 4-20
(1951).
* —–,"Dieu des philosophes et Dieu des chrétiens," Revue de
Théologie et de Philosophie, v. 6, p. 203-15 (1954).
c. Selected Literature about the 1930s Christian Philosophy Debates
and Positions on the Issue of Christian Philosophy
* d'Andrea, Thomas, "Rethinking the Christian Philosophy Debate:
An Old Puzzle and Some New Points of Orientation," Acta Philosophica,
vol. 1, no. 2, p. 191-214.
* Badoux, Bernard, O.F.M., "Quaestio de philosophia christiana,"
Antonianum, vol. 11, p. 487-552 (1936).
* de Blic, J., S.J., "Quonam sensu recta sit locutio 'philosophia
christiana'?", Acta Secundi Congressus Thomistici Internationalis, p.
450-453 (1936).
* Bremond, André, S.J. "Rationalisme et Religion," Archives de
philosophie, vol. 11, no. 4, p. 1-59 (1934)
* Bogliolo, Luigi. Il problema della filosophia cristiana
(Brescia: Morcelliana. 1959)
* —–, La Filosophia Cristiana: Il problema, la storia, la
struttura (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana. 1986)
* Chenu, Marie-Domnique. "Les 'Philosophes' dans la philosophie
chrétienne médievale," Revue des Sciences philosophiques et
théologiques, vol. 27, no. 1, p. 27-40 (1937).
* —– , "Note pour l'histoire de la notion de philosophie
chrétienne," Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques, vol.
21 no. 2, p. 230-5 (1932).
* —– , "Ratio superior et inferior. Un cas de philosophie
chrétienne," Laval Théologique et Philosophique, vol. 1 , no. 1, p.
119-23 (1945).
* Coreth Emmerich, W. M. Neidl and G. Pfligersdorffer, eds.
Christliche Philosophie im katholischen Denken des 19. und 20.
Jahrhunderts, v. Neue Ansätze im 19. Jahrhundert (Graz/Wien/Köln:
1987).
* —–, Christliche Philosophie im katholischen Denken des 19. und
20. Jahrhunderts, v. 2: Rückgriff auf scholastisches Erbe.
(Graz/Wien/Köln: 1988).
* —–, Christliche Philosophie im katholischen Denken des 19. und
20. Jahrhundert,v. 3: Moderne Strömungen im 20. Jahrhundert
(Graz/Wien/Köln: 1990).
* Donneaud, Henry, O.P, "Etienne Gilson et Maurice Blondel dans le
débat sur la philosophie chrétienne", Revue Thomiste. vol. 99, p.
497-516
* English, Adam C. The Possibility of Christian Philosophy :
Maurice Blondel at the Intersection of Theology and Philosophy. (New
York : Routledge. 2007)
* Forest, Aimé,"Deux historiens de la philosophie"in Philosophe de
la chrétienité. (Paris: Cerf. 1949)
* —– , "'La philosophie du Moyen Age' d'après M. Emile Bréhier",
Revue de Métaphysique et de la Morale (1939).
* Floucat, Yves. Métaphysique et religion. Vers une sagesse
chrétienne intégrale (Paris: Téqui 1989).
* —–,Pour une philosophie chrétienne: élements d'un débat
fondamental (Paris: Téqui. 1983)
* Gouhier, Henri. "Digression sur la philosophie à propos de la
philosophie chrétienne", Recherches Philosophiques, vol. 3, p. 211-236
(1933).
* —– , Etienne Gilson: Trois Essais: Bergson, La philosophie
chrétienne, l'art. (Paris: Vrin. 1993)
* —– , La philosophie et son histoire. (Paris: Vrin. 1947)
* —– , "De l'histoire de la Philosophie à la Philosophie" in
Etienne Gilson: Philosophe de la chrétienité. (Paris: Cerf. 1949)
* —– , "Philosophie chrétienne et théologie", Revue Philosophique
de la France et de l'étranger, vol.125, p. 23-65 (1938).
* Hayen, André. "Philosophie de conversion – philosophie du
converti", L'ami du Clergé, no. 46, p. 705-12. Translated as
"Philosophy of the Converted – Philosophy of Conversion: Blondel and
Maritain," Philosophy Today, vol. 6, no. 2, p. 283-94.
* Henrici, Peter. Aufbrüche christlichen Denkens (Einsiedeln: Johannes 1978)
* —–, "Der Beitrag christlichen Philosophierens heute", in Die
Philosophie in der modernen Welt. Gedenkschrift Alwin Diemer, ed. U.
Hinke-Dürnemann (Frankfurt: Peter Lang. 1988) p. 819-31.
* —–, "Der Gott der Philosophen", Internationale Katholische
Zeitschrift Communio, v. 17
* —–, "Philosophieren aus dem Glauben: Hundert Jahre nach Aeterni
Patris," Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, vol. 103, p. 361-73.
* —–, "The One Who Went Unnamed: Maurice Blondel in the Encyclical
Fides et Ratio," Communio, vol. 26, p. 609-621.
* Copleston, Frederick Charles, S.J. History of Philosophy, vol.
9: Maine De Biran to Sartre (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press. 1975)
* —–, "The One Who Went Unnamed: Maurice Blondel in the Encyclical
Fides et Ratio," Communio, vol. 26, p. 609-621.
* Jordan, Mark D., "The Terms of the Debate over 'Christian
Philosophy,'" Communio: International Catholic Review, vol. 12, p.
293-311.
* Livi, Antonio. Blondel, Bréhier, Gilson, Maritain: il problema
della filosofia cristiana. (Bolonia: Patron. 1974)
* Long, Fiachra. "The Blondel-Gilson Correspondence through
Foucault's Mirror" Philosophy Today, vol. 35, no. 4, p. 351-361.
* Maydieu, Jean-Joseph, "Le bilan d'un débat philosophique:
réflexions sur la philosophie chrétienne," Bulletin de Littérature
Ecclésiastique, no. 9-10, p. 193-22 (1935).
* McInerny, Ralph. Art and Prudence: Studies in the Thought of
Jacques Maritain. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 1988)
* —–,"John Paul II and Christian Philosophy," in John Paul II:
Witness to Truth : Proceedings from the Twenty-Third Annual Convention
of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars. Kenneth Whitehead, ed., p.
113-25.
* —–,Praeambula Fidei: Thomism and the God of the Philosophers.
(Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. 2006)
* —–,"Reflections on Christian Philosophy" in One Hundred Years of
Thomism: Aeterni Patris and Afterwards. A Symposium Victor B Bresik,
C.S.B., ed. (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies. 1981).
* Nédoncelle, Maurice, Existe-t-il une philosophie chrétienne?
(Paris: Fayard. 1957), translated as Is There a Christian Philosophy?
(Hawthorn Books. 1960)
* Owens, Joseph. "Neo-Thomism and Christian Philosophy" in
Thomistic Papers, v. 6.
* —–,"The Need for Christian Philosophy,"Faith and Philosophy, vol 11, no 2.
* —–, Towards a Christian Philosophy. (Washington D.C.: CUA Press. 1990).
* Peperzak, Adriaan T. Philosophy Between Faith and Theology:
Addresses To Catholic Intellectuals. (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press. 2005)
* —–, Reason In Faith: On the Relevance of Christian Spirituality
for Philosophy (New York: Paulist Press. 1999)
* Prouvost, Gery. Catholicité de l'intelligence métaphysique : La
philosophie dans la foi selon Jacques Maritain (Paris: Tequi. 1991)
* Renard, Alex, La Querelle sur la possibilité de la philosophie
chrétienne: essai documentaire et critique (Paris: Editions Ecole et
College. 1941).
* Romeyer, Blaise, "Autour du problème de la philosophie
chrétienne: essai critique et positif", Archives de philosophie, vol.
10, no. 4, p. 1-64 (1934).
* Sadler, Gregory B. "St. Anselm's Fides Quaerens Intellectum as a
Model for Christian Philosophy ", The Saint Anselm Journal, vol. 4,
no. 1, p. 32-58.
* Secretan, Philibert, ed. La philosophie chrétienne d'inspiration
catholique: Constants et controverses, positions actuelles (Fribourg:
Academic Press Fribourg. 2006).
* Sillem, Edward A., "Perspectives on Christian Philosophy", The
Clergy Review, vol. 46, no. 3, p. 149-65. republished in Philosophy
Today, vol. 5, no. 1/4, p. 3-13.
* Tilliette, Xavier. "Edith Stein et la philosophie chretienne: A
propos d'Etre fini et Etre eternel", Greganorium, vol. 71, p. 97-113.
* —–,Le Christ de la philosophie: Prolégomènes à une christologie
philosophique. (Paris: Cerf. 1990).
* —–,. "le pere de Lubac et le debat de la philosophie
chrétienne," Etudes Philosophique. 1995, no. 2.
* West, Jason L. A. "The Thomistic Debate Concerning the Existence
and Nature of Christian Philosophy: Towards a Synthesis," The Modern
Schoolman, vol. 77, p. 49-72.
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